Substrate of Consciousness
This post is fun to read once processed by Perplexity AI here.
Len writes: My thoughts on this matter have to do with the physical substrate of consciousness and its possible dependence on entanglement as a means of messaging.
Well ..
"The physical substrate of consciousness" ...
There are some metaphors and analogies in that idea that need to be made explicit (Hofstader's Surfaces and Essences is always looking over my shoulder).
The analogy at work here seems to be that "consciousness" is like a thing of some sort - a kind of physical substance. It would seem to be as easy to think of consciousness as a process - particularly a kind of "calculation". It does seem that calculations need a "substrate" - a physical medium to work. Hofstadter spent a lot of time on this idea in his famous "Goedel, Escher, Bach", which won him a Pulitzer. In fact, the idea underlies most of the Science Fiction ideas about consciousness, including the "Singularity", which takes it for granted that human consciousness doesn't depend on any specific "substrate" but would be perfectly OK if transferred to silicon.
This idea is itself an extended metaphor, depending as it does on an image of the mind as some kind of calculation "like" a computer. Indeed, this is a common theme among philosophers who claim to have "solved" the "hard problem" of consciousness. They begin by assuming that the metaphor is more than an analogy - it is fact and that the only problem is to describe how the mind arises (or "emerges") out of the substrate. Fame and fortune await anyone who "solves" the "hard problem".
For those who have fallen far down this rabbit hole, it is hard to spot how this could not be true. Isn't the only alternative "Descarte's Error" - the idea that there are two worlds - the universe of spirit and the universe of matter, somehow interacting through mysterious means? I believe they call this idea "Dualism", but don't quote me.
This is a common fallacy, especially prevalent in politics. If somebody else's idea is wrong, mine must be right.
As I pointed out in our breakfast conversation, total knowledge of the "substrate" of an iPhone doesn't tell us anything fundamental about what an iPhone does and what it is for. We are not lacking in information about the "substrate" of mental functions - presumably the brain. What philosophers always miss is that most of what we know about this "substrate" has been learned in the last 25 years and the "takeaway" is that we have centuries of work ahead of us to understand even this aspect of consciousness. Fans of "entanglement" are "jumping the queue", claiming victory over all the scientists hard at work making real discoveries about brain function, to claim what amounts to a theological connection between entanglement and consciousness. Is it too much to call it theological? Are we not substituting the nakedly theological reasoning of Descartes (where the spirit world is home to God) with the pseudo-scientific idea that "entanglement" is the door to a previously unsuspected realm of reality?
Before I go on, I must point out one issue I have with the idea of the "hard problem". Most people, when they see something referred to as a "problem", automatically assume that there is a "solution" out there. In this case, a Nobel Prize awaits anyone who "solves" the problem. But not all issues that can be framed as "problems" have solutions. As discussed at breakfast, this was something I learned (and actually used) in my thesis in 1969.
Let's go back to the "calculation" analogy. It's quite true a calculation seems to need a "substrate" but, mysteriously, the substrate seems to be irrelevant to the formal description or function of the calculation. Perhaps we should take some time to focus on that "mystery" before tossing out the awkward details to focus on the "substrate" idea, which, after all, seems to be irrelevant in the case of a calculation. What makes a calculation a calculation? I'd say it's quite like the observer in Quantum Mechanics or in Relativity. A calculation is in the eye of the beholder (ignoring for the moment Wolfram's claim that the whole universe is a big calculation). So, even in the case of an apparently "mechanical" calculation, you need a mind - a "programmer" - someone who has purposefully arranged material events to produce a meaningful result. It would seem to me that the analogy falls apart as soon as you include the programmer into the "other side" of the analogy.
It seems to me that "mind" does, indeed, require a substrate. Ultimately, there seems to be no reason to suspect that "mind" is a phenomenon outside the realm of physics. "Mind" obviously requires at least a brain and there is no mystery about this (a vast amount of experimental data verifies this). Since our brains are physical objects, we may assume that "deep down" they follow the rules of quantum mechanics. But we find these rules to be of limited explanatory value in our models of small molecules, let alone the huge molecules involved in life processes. We seem to be doing very well with "ordinary" chemistry and biology. See, for example, the Saporsky's wonderful "Behave", which delves deeply into the many-layered mystery of human behaviour in terms that range from synapse function to cultural pressures. Saporsky takes up perhaps the most relevant aspect of "mind" - namely, Why we do what we do? His answer draws on "bleeding edge" experimental science and provide a sense of where more information might come from. For the purpose of the current topic, "explanations" of behaviour whiz past chemistry rather quickly to include the organism's environment. It makes no sense to discuss behaviour without discussing the organism's actual or perceived environment, or, to put a fine point on it, what the mind is for.
Incidentally, when you learn the actual details of how behaviour arises, the analogy of a "calculation" seems remarkably unhelpful, but there is one idea that pops out. If we acknowledge that "mind" is somehow related to behaviour - and that behaviour is really the main clue that we have that mind is present, does it make sense to talk about the "substrate" of behaviour? Indeed it does - as Saporsky shows at length. In short, the "substrate" of behaviour is reality itself in all its staggering complexity.
Dawkins himself (the author of "Selfish Gene") was great at "substrate" questions. His "memes" required the substrate of the human brain (plus human society if you think of it). He also invented the idea of the "extended phenotype", which recognizes the behaviour and the environment of an organism as important as its physical form (phenotype). Our "extended phenotype" includes a mind. Damasio does an excellent job of tracing the emergence of "mind" in tiny steps all the way through evolution from, as puts it "From Bacteria to Bach".
In spite of all this great work, the "hard problem" of consciousness remains unsolved. Damasio comes closest when he gives the problem the respect it deserves. Why does it feel this way to be alive? Consciousness is a feeling. What, exactly, is a feeling?
Len writes: My thoughts on this matter have to do with the physical substrate of consciousness and its possible dependence on entanglement as a means of messaging.
Well ..
"The physical substrate of consciousness" ...
There are some metaphors and analogies in that idea that need to be made explicit (Hofstader's Surfaces and Essences is always looking over my shoulder).
The analogy at work here seems to be that "consciousness" is like a thing of some sort - a kind of physical substance. It would seem to be as easy to think of consciousness as a process - particularly a kind of "calculation". It does seem that calculations need a "substrate" - a physical medium to work. Hofstadter spent a lot of time on this idea in his famous "Goedel, Escher, Bach", which won him a Pulitzer. In fact, the idea underlies most of the Science Fiction ideas about consciousness, including the "Singularity", which takes it for granted that human consciousness doesn't depend on any specific "substrate" but would be perfectly OK if transferred to silicon.
This idea is itself an extended metaphor, depending as it does on an image of the mind as some kind of calculation "like" a computer. Indeed, this is a common theme among philosophers who claim to have "solved" the "hard problem" of consciousness. They begin by assuming that the metaphor is more than an analogy - it is fact and that the only problem is to describe how the mind arises (or "emerges") out of the substrate. Fame and fortune await anyone who "solves" the "hard problem".
For those who have fallen far down this rabbit hole, it is hard to spot how this could not be true. Isn't the only alternative "Descarte's Error" - the idea that there are two worlds - the universe of spirit and the universe of matter, somehow interacting through mysterious means? I believe they call this idea "Dualism", but don't quote me.
This is a common fallacy, especially prevalent in politics. If somebody else's idea is wrong, mine must be right.
As I pointed out in our breakfast conversation, total knowledge of the "substrate" of an iPhone doesn't tell us anything fundamental about what an iPhone does and what it is for. We are not lacking in information about the "substrate" of mental functions - presumably the brain. What philosophers always miss is that most of what we know about this "substrate" has been learned in the last 25 years and the "takeaway" is that we have centuries of work ahead of us to understand even this aspect of consciousness. Fans of "entanglement" are "jumping the queue", claiming victory over all the scientists hard at work making real discoveries about brain function, to claim what amounts to a theological connection between entanglement and consciousness. Is it too much to call it theological? Are we not substituting the nakedly theological reasoning of Descartes (where the spirit world is home to God) with the pseudo-scientific idea that "entanglement" is the door to a previously unsuspected realm of reality?
Before I go on, I must point out one issue I have with the idea of the "hard problem". Most people, when they see something referred to as a "problem", automatically assume that there is a "solution" out there. In this case, a Nobel Prize awaits anyone who "solves" the problem. But not all issues that can be framed as "problems" have solutions. As discussed at breakfast, this was something I learned (and actually used) in my thesis in 1969.
Let's go back to the "calculation" analogy. It's quite true a calculation seems to need a "substrate" but, mysteriously, the substrate seems to be irrelevant to the formal description or function of the calculation. Perhaps we should take some time to focus on that "mystery" before tossing out the awkward details to focus on the "substrate" idea, which, after all, seems to be irrelevant in the case of a calculation. What makes a calculation a calculation? I'd say it's quite like the observer in Quantum Mechanics or in Relativity. A calculation is in the eye of the beholder (ignoring for the moment Wolfram's claim that the whole universe is a big calculation). So, even in the case of an apparently "mechanical" calculation, you need a mind - a "programmer" - someone who has purposefully arranged material events to produce a meaningful result. It would seem to me that the analogy falls apart as soon as you include the programmer into the "other side" of the analogy.
It seems to me that "mind" does, indeed, require a substrate. Ultimately, there seems to be no reason to suspect that "mind" is a phenomenon outside the realm of physics. "Mind" obviously requires at least a brain and there is no mystery about this (a vast amount of experimental data verifies this). Since our brains are physical objects, we may assume that "deep down" they follow the rules of quantum mechanics. But we find these rules to be of limited explanatory value in our models of small molecules, let alone the huge molecules involved in life processes. We seem to be doing very well with "ordinary" chemistry and biology. See, for example, the Saporsky's wonderful "Behave", which delves deeply into the many-layered mystery of human behaviour in terms that range from synapse function to cultural pressures. Saporsky takes up perhaps the most relevant aspect of "mind" - namely, Why we do what we do? His answer draws on "bleeding edge" experimental science and provide a sense of where more information might come from. For the purpose of the current topic, "explanations" of behaviour whiz past chemistry rather quickly to include the organism's environment. It makes no sense to discuss behaviour without discussing the organism's actual or perceived environment, or, to put a fine point on it, what the mind is for.
Incidentally, when you learn the actual details of how behaviour arises, the analogy of a "calculation" seems remarkably unhelpful, but there is one idea that pops out. If we acknowledge that "mind" is somehow related to behaviour - and that behaviour is really the main clue that we have that mind is present, does it make sense to talk about the "substrate" of behaviour? Indeed it does - as Saporsky shows at length. In short, the "substrate" of behaviour is reality itself in all its staggering complexity.
Dawkins himself (the author of "Selfish Gene") was great at "substrate" questions. His "memes" required the substrate of the human brain (plus human society if you think of it). He also invented the idea of the "extended phenotype", which recognizes the behaviour and the environment of an organism as important as its physical form (phenotype). Our "extended phenotype" includes a mind. Damasio does an excellent job of tracing the emergence of "mind" in tiny steps all the way through evolution from, as puts it "From Bacteria to Bach".
In spite of all this great work, the "hard problem" of consciousness remains unsolved. Damasio comes closest when he gives the problem the respect it deserves. Why does it feel this way to be alive? Consciousness is a feeling. What, exactly, is a feeling?
I'd like to propose that statefullness is not consciousness. A substrate is essentially state.
ReplyDeleteI'd like to present that an atomic transition of state is consciousness.
/george